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Abstract  
The cotton boom in Burkina Faso consisted of a growth in cotton land shares together with an overall increase in 
total cultivated land. This paper examines the impact of institutional changes in the cotton sector on the 
evolution of smallholders’ land-use decisions. The empirical analysis is supported by a structural model that 
takes into account the specific institutional features of the Burkinabè cotton sector and builds upon household-
level data collected in rural Burkina Faso. We attribute most of the change in land use to the newly established 
institutional arrangements between producers and stakeholders, mechanization, and slackening of the food-
security constraint. 
JEL Codes:  N57, 013, O33, Q15, Q18  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Initiated in the late 1980s, commodity market reforms have generated one of the most 
controversial policy debates in Sub-Saharan Africa. Based on the premise that liberalized 
commodity markets would increase agricultural profitability, which in turn would stimulate 
farm investment and rural development, the dismantling of official boards and other 
parastatals was expected to raise both commodity output and supply-chain performance. Yet, 
significant increases in farm productivity have not generally been observed and the reform 
programs have produced mixed results, often due to the overlooking of commodity-specific 
and rural institutional frameworks (Jayne et al. 1997). 
Often quoted as one of the few success stories of agricultural development in Sahelian 
countries, the cotton sector is now a leading contributor to economic growth (Azam and 
Djimtoingar 2007) and the dominant cash crop for farmers in the region. It is also one of the 
major strategic components for poverty reduction in rural areas, and the major source of cash 
inflow and export earnings for those countries (Goreux 2003). The cotton success story was 
not only driven by major technical advancements but also through institutional changes, 
supported by millions of smallholders (Bassett 2001). Until recently in most West African 
cotton-producing countries, the sector was organized in a very integrated fashion, with 
parastatals involved in input provision, ginning, and marketing. Increasingly poor economic 
performance was experienced from the late 1980s however, associated with huge financial 
insolvencies, poorly managed boards, and a high tax burden on producers. The reform 
process—where it has been undertaken—has been supported by changes in economic and 
social institutions, including market reorganization (inputs, seed cotton, ginning, marketing, 
rural credit), partial to full privatization of the industry, and institutional arrangements 
between producers, investors and governments. 
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In Burkina Faso, the reform started in the early 1990s and consisted of a new institutional 
design prior to privatizing the industry, including partnership agreements between ginneries 
and producers, and new local organizations of cotton growers. Smallholder cotton production 
was handled by marketing cooperatives through specific contractual arrangements with 
agribusinesses (outgrower schemes). Burkina Faso became the African cotton leader in 
production and export in 2006 and 2007, partly thanks to an unprecedented growth of its 
cotton area. Even though observed growth in seed cotton production should not be attributed 
to internal factors alone (given the effect of the Cote d’Ivoire crisis that started in 2002 and 
cross-border cotton smuggling), such factors have played an essential role in the cotton 
growth pattern (see Kaminski et al. 2009). 
In this paper, we explore the way institutional changes simultaneously affected land-use 
patterns and the attractiveness for cotton, at the level of the smallholder and in the course of 
the reform. Since small producers face a number of significant constraints, notably market 
incompleteness (rural credit, food, or land markets) and liquidity constraints, the institutional 
environment has a major influence on land-use decisions. Due to its focus on institutional 
innovations, the Burkinabè reform is a particularly relevant case in point. 
The key empirical ingredient of the paper is the estimation of the joint probability of 
changes in cotton land share (land use) and in total cultivated land (land cultivation), under 
several econometric specifications allowing in particular for the treatment of endogeneity of 
land-use decisions. The econometric model of land-use changes is supported by a conceptual 
model which accounts for the institutional features of the Burkinabè cotton economy: social 
norms for land allocation, missing food and land markets, and constrained access to 
agricultural inputs. Our original sample of 300 cotton producers includes variables reflecting 
institutional constraints (access to inputs, payment date, outlet marketing) and farmers’ 
objectives (income and food security), performance of their cooperatives, as well as their own 
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endowments (human and capital stock). Both observed and retrospective (stated) determinants 
are used as explanatory variables of growth in agricultural land and in cotton land share at the 
household level over the period of the reform. To partially control for measurement errors 
associated with retrospective surveys, the dependent variables in the model are ordered 
discrete and describe past changes in total land and land for cotton. Reported ex post changes 
in land-use patterns by farmers are subjected to several checks and controls (use of control 
variables), to deal with selection bias and endogeneity of land-use decision explanatory 
variables. 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence for the key role of the 
upgrading of institutional arrangements in cotton production growth, in a context of 
agricultural market failures and limited scope of institutions. We show that, all else being 
equal, earlier cash payments, better access to inputs, and outlet guarantees explain the 
increase in cotton land share, together with a partial slackening of the food-security constraint 
thanks to increased land cultivation. Our analysis is in line with the economic literature on 
transaction costs in African markets (Fafchamps 2004), regarding in particular the way 
institutional innovations help lower transaction costs on rural markets (e.g., through services 
provided by farmers’ groups in terms of credit and rotating savings, see Van Bastelaer and 
Leathers 2006; Van den Brink and Chavas 1997). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the main institutional 
changes under the cotton reform of Burkina Faso and in the environment of producers. 
Section 3 presents the empirical strategy followed in this paper, including a conceptual 
framework for land cultivation and land use and the estimation strategy. We consider several 
estimation procedures for the system of land-use equations and specification tests adapted to 
the case of ordered discrete dependent variables. The data sample and the construction of 
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variables are discussed is Section 4. Estimation results are presented in Section 5 and Section 
6 concludes. 
 
II. CHANGES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF COTTON 
SMALLHOLDERS 
Institutional Changes in the Cotton Sector and Growth in Cotton Areas 
From Burkina Faso’s independence in 1960 to the early 1990s, the parastatal firm SOFITEX 
(national cotton fiber company) held a monopsony in seed cotton and a monopoly in input 
provision and distribution, input credit, ginning and marketing cotton fiber. Groups of village 
producers, the GVs (Groupements Villageois), managed input credit schemes and self-
marketing of their seed cotton to the parastatal, while research and extension services were 
provided by the government. The system performed well until the 1990s1 due to top-quality 
agronomic research and sufficient coordination between the GVs, the banks and SOFITEX. 
Increasing budget deficits were however experienced by SOFITEX, with a decrease in the 
repayment rates of input credit from GVs, and increasing opportunities for rent-seeking 
activities and corruption among parastatal’s agents and GV leaders. As a consequence, a 
reform plan was agreed upon by the producers’ representatives, SOFITEX, and the State in 
the early 1990s. 
Burkina Faso became the largest African cotton producer in 2006 with production 
increasing threefold between 2001 and 2006, an achievement that was unprecedented in the 
entire region (FAO 2007). As shown by Kaminski et al. (2009), the cotton reform was a 
decisive factor, amplified by the effect of the Ivorian Crisis in 2002 that resulted in a massive 
inflow of Burkinabè farmers, formerly settled in Côte d’Ivoire. This labor force was oriented 
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towards the cotton sector by the new incentives generated by the sector’s reform, which 
contributed to the process of land extension. 
Instead of leading to a more intensive use of chemical inputs (pesticide and fertilizer), as 
confirmed by national agricultural censuses and surveys (DGPSA - Direction générale des 
prévisions statistiques agricoles 2006; INSD - Institut National des Statistiques et de la 
Démographie 2006), cotton growth has relied mostly on area extension2 caused by a rapid 
process of mechanization in cotton regions, and more labor allocated to this crop (FAO 2007). 
The latter effect can be explained by an increase in cotton land share, demographic growth 
and migration to cotton zones. According to French Cooperation, World Bank and INSD 
experts, the price of seed cotton did not influence land-use choices during the period of the 
reform. Rather, cotton areas increased substantially because of cotton growers’ rising 
confidence in the sector and a better access to inputs. Three factors behind such greater 
confidence of farmers in the system can be put forward. 
First, new local institutions for cotton growers allowed for the implementation of more 
attractive outgrower schemes. The former joint-liability system of GVs matched cotton with 
non-cotton growers from the same villages for their input needs, leading to opportunistic 
behavior and less incentives for cotton production. The first step of the reform, starting in 
1996, consisted in replacing GVs with a new type of producer group specifically designed for 
cotton growers, denoted GPC (Groupements de Producteurs de Coton, Cotton Producer 
Groups). Matching by affinity and self-selection became the core mechanism of these new 
institutions, allowing for better peer-monitoring capabilities and resulting in more cooperative 
behavior (Kaminski 2007). As a consequence, repayment rates increased by up to 95% and 
the GPCs have been continuously attracting new producers ever since they became 
operational in 2000. 
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Second, producers gained significant bargaining power in the management of the sector. 
The increase in production starting in 1999 was also a consequence of the privatization of 
SOFITEX—with producers as stakeholders—and the emergence of a strongly integrated 
union of cotton growers. In 1999, the government transferred half of its capital shares to the 
National Union of Cotton Producers (UNPCB, Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton du 
Burkina Faso), the new national union for cotton growers, while research and extension 
services were delegated to SOFITEX and the cotton unions. Producers were involved in 
management and decisions on pricing, funds for research and extension services, input 
provision, management of input credit, etc. Cotton unions were in charge of the provision of 
cereal inputs instead of SOFITEX, while the latter focused on the delivery and credit for 
cotton inputs. 
Third, the management of the ginning firm SOFITEX improved and the rise of producers’ 
bargaining power enabled them to increase their share in the overall value added of the sector, 
obtaining a higher cotton price in a period where the world price was declining (Baffes 2004). 
SOFITEX received new support from the banks to provide input credit to an increasing 
number of GPCs, hence sustaining the beginning of the cotton “boom”. The entry of new 
investors in 2003 also brought new funds to the cotton sector, the private sector being 
encouraged to build ginneries and provide services to farmers in regions where the parastatal 
company was not operating effectively, thus expanding the cotton-producing area. Subsequent 
stages of the reform involved a more flexible price-setting mechanism, more in line with 
world price and supplemented by an independently-managed stabilization fund. 
The partnership between ginning firms as local monopolies and a strongly integrated 
cotton union was significant in the successful implementation of the reform, thanks to 
effective vertical coordination. Farmers have benefited from the reform, taking on a growing 
number of responsibilities as their political and bargaining power increased (World Bank 
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2004). With reduced or non-existent deficits and a sustainable credit scheme, banks have 
raised their commitment to cotton companies, leading to more credit allowances for a growing 
number of producers. This has also provided producers with better access to cereal inputs, so 
that the cotton reform has been beneficial for grain production and food-security concerns as 
well (Kaminski et al. 2009), allowing one third of cotton-producing households to become 
food-secure. 
Concomitantly with this renewed confidence in the cotton sector, production increased 
continuously from 210,000 to 710,000 tons of seed cotton annually from 2001 to 2006. Given 
the difficulty to interpret aggregate (country-level) data, we now focus on the determinants of 
cotton extensive growth at the household level.  
 
Institutional Arrangements for Accessing Land and Inputs 
Social norms on access to land and access to inputs also play a role in farmers’ land-use 
decisions, being part of their institutional and social environment, 
There is no market for land in Burkina Faso, but land can be obtained through secured 
rights of usage (inheritance in the restricted lineage, clearing of bush, gift), or unsecured 
rights (loan, temporary letting), with the latter rights possibly becoming more secure over 
time (Stamm 1994). Empirical evidence suggests that land rights do not matter much in the 
allocation of factors and land investment among households in Burkina Faso, because local 
peasants do not feel insecure about their usage rights (Sawadogo and Stamm 2000; Brasselle 
et al. 2002). This differs from Udry and Goldstein (2008) and Udry (1996) where land 
allocation is inefficient among (more insecure rights) and within households (gender-
differentiated rights). 
Due to population growth and imigration, southwest Burkina Faso has been subject to 
high demographic pressure for land, resulting in higher uncertainty on land rights and lower 
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soil quality (Gray and Kevane 2001). Farmers responded by intensifying their farming 
systems and adopted more conservation-oriented practices, independently from their land 
tenure status. Over the course of the immigration process, farmers from migrant ethnic groups 
have been more and more willing to invest in soil quality. Claims over land from non-resident 
ethnic group members resulted in less fertile soils, and new migrants are sometimes denied 
access to land. Hence, in addition to other social and political considerations, ethnic origin 
matters in the patterns of households’ cultivated land. 
Input access has also improved because the GPC-based system has allowed better-
connected individuals to gain access to inputs according to their experience and their land-use 
pattern (cotton is usually the only cash income source to repay input credit). Accessing inputs 
no longer depends on social status or ethnic origin but on overall management of the GPC.3 
Credit markets in rural areas are almost non-existent in Burkina Faso, and the only way to 
access input credit is often through GPCs, for both cotton and cereal cultivation. 
 
III.  THE MODEL 
To evaluate the role of institutional changes in the observed patterns of cotton areas, we first 
present a conceptual model of land use which accounts for market incompleteness and 
institutional arrangements with farmers. 
 
A Model of Land Use under Incomplete Markets and Outgrower Schemes 
Decisions about land use for rural Sahelian households are often modeled by lexicographic 
preferences according to a primary income goal and a secondary food-security goal 
(Abdoulaye and Sanders 2006). Because some markets are missing or poorly integrated, 
production decisions are not separable from consumption ones and a food self-sufficiency 
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strategy can be optimal for a rural household (De Janvry et al. 1991; Fafchamps 1992; Jayne 
1994). Hence, it is relevant to account simultaneously for food-security and income 
constraints in the optimization problem of the household. In our case, the cotton crop is 
institutionally favored compared to other crops, because input credit is available through 
outgrower arrangements for cotton and through GPC membership for cereals. Moreover, 
outgrower schemes ensure that farmers will have guaranteed outlets and early cash payment, a 
crucial feature for smallholders with cash constraints and low access to credit. 
Consider a representative household allocating farm land L  to two types of crops, food 
(F) and cash crops (non food, NF) with corresponding land areas and F NFL L  so that 
 + F NFL L L= . Each crop is associated with a farmer-specific technology, represented by the 
following profit level per unit of land: 
( ) , , ,k k kC k F NFπΠ = − =kx       [1] 
where ( )kπ i  is random and concave, ( )1 2, , ,k k kJx x x= …kx  is a vector of J variable inputs, 
and kC  is the non-random cost (per unit of land) of cultivating land with crop k. We assume 
this cost is proportional to land for crop k: k k k k kC c L c l L= = , where kl  is the land share of 
crop k, so that the total cost of land cultivation is implicitly quadratic. With this specification, 
profit is separable in variable and land costs, and the randomness of profit appears only 
through the profit component associated with variable costs, kπ . Given total arable land L, the 
problem of the household is to determine the optimal level of inputs xkj, k=1,…, K ; j=1,…, J, 
and land shares lk , k=1,…,K. As a local approximation to a more general utility function, we 
specify a mean-variance utility function of profit (see for example Chavas and Holt 1990; and 
Coyle 1999; on production models with uncertainty, where land is a decision variable), so that 
the farmer solves: 
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where γ is a measure of relative risk aversion taking positive values, V  denotes the household 
goal in terms of income, ( , , )F Fl L x x  is the food-security goal, and ( )F kx l  is the 
corresponding level of input available for food crops. Arable land and input access may be 
constrained or rationed by the aforementioned social mechanisms and by cotton firms, with 
x and L  the corresponding upper bounds of inputs and land. Hence, the last five constraints 
in (3) capture the institutional environment of cotton farmers under incomplete markets. Once 
the income goal is achieved, the household tries to reach its food-security goal but may not 
maximize income. If the income goal is only achieved when the food-security goal is not, then 
the household allocates land and inputs so as to move closer to the latter.4  
At the optimum, the first constraint in (3) is binding and, if the constraints on total land, 
total inputs, inputs and land used for food crop are not binding, the first-order conditions of 
problem (2)-(3) can be written explicitly as: 
1*
1
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k i
i
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i i i
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E Ll
x x
π σγ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ,   [4] 
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where (.)²kσ  is the variance of kπ . These optimal land shares and input use levels allow the 
farmer to reach the income and food-security goals, and entail unconstrained use of inputs and 
land. Optimal land use depends on the relative risk-profitability profiles of all crops, which 
are themselves functions of household-specific technologies and input use, and therefore 
indirectly of output and input prices, and risk aversion. Partial differentiation of (4) with 
respect to land and inputs reveals that land use and input allocation are positively correlated, 
that is, all else being equal, the bigger the land share, the more input applied to the crop (see 
the appendix for computational details). Relative profitability among crops matters less for 
land use when total cultivated land increases, whereas input use increases if we assume that 
input use reduces profit variability. 
Accounting for other binding constraints, we obtain that 
*, , k kk F NF l l∀ = =    if  *( , )kxkV l V≥   and * ( , , )xF F Fl l L x≥  ,   [5] 
( , , )xF F Fl l L x=     if  ( , , )kxk FV l l V≥   and * ( , , )xF F Fl l L x<  ,   [6] 
( ) ( , , )xF F F Fl l V l L x= ≤     if  ( , )kxk FV l l V<   and * ( , , )xF F Fl l L x<  .  [7] 
Thus, land use is not only affected by available land for cultivation because of risk aversion 
and risk-diversification opportunities, but also by food-security reasons, and constraints on 
land and inputs. Decisions about land use and land cultivation are not sequential, and the 
above insights therefore support the idea that land use and cultivation patterns should be 
considered simultaneous and interdependent processes. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
To derive a system of reduced-form equations for changes in land and cotton areas from the 
structural model above, several steps are required. First, optimal solutions for land shares are 
linearized through a first-order approximation around village means. Second, the model is 
 13
transformed into an equivalent least-square dummy-variable representation (in levels). Third, 
a time-in-difference transformation is performed on model equations, to obtain the final 
system of equations with latent variables which can be estimated using a discrete-choice 
model specification. 
Let us define X and Y, two vectors of all-crop and household characteristics, respectively. 
X is composed of crop prices and price-variability profiles, production risk and cost 
components. Y accounts for households’ crop technologies, human and farm capital, risk 
aversion, labor force, social status, cotton experience, ethnic background, and non-farm 
opportunities. Let ( , , , , , )k Fx L V l= W X Y  denote the full vector of household and crop 
characteristics, and ( , , , , , )FL V l= kW x X Y  the vector of village-specific means of the 
corresponding variables. 
A first-order approximation of (4) around village-average characteristics such that (6) and 
(7) are feasible gives: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 'k k
WW W W W D ΔW
W
k
k k
ll l ∂− ≈ × − =∂ ,     [8] 
where Dk is the vector of partial derivatives of lk with respect to these characteristics, and 
ΔWk  is the vector of deviations of household characteristics from village averages, which can 
be written:  
( ) ( , , , , , )k k kΔW W W x x X X Y Y F FL L V V l l= − = − − − − − − . 
Because markets are incomplete, as represented by constraints (3), optimal land-use and 
input-use choices are endogenously affected by household-specific characteristics, as 
represented in cases (6) and (7). Indeed, the specific income and food-security goals of each 
household, as well as their access to inputs and land may cause the constraints to be binding 
in (3). The impact of these constraints may be captured by introducing Lagrangian multipliers, 
which would modify the expression derived in (4) to (6) or (7). For that reason, these 
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household-specific characteristics are introduced in vector W, since Lagrangian multipliers 
would then be implicitly part of vector Dk, as shadow costs associated with these constraints. 
As a first approximation, equation (8) gives rise to a linear expression when components 
of Dk are assumed constant across households. This linear form admits a fixed effects (within-
group) representation where village-specific components of lk and W are wiped out. It is well 
known (see, e.g., Krishnakumar 2006) that an equivalent model obtains with variables in 
levels and village dummy variables introduced as additional explanatory variables. Access to 
input, input use level, income and food-security goals all depend on (endogenous) land 
access,5 as well as on (exogenous) crop and household-specific characteristics. We can 
therefore explicitly represent endogeneity of total land by considering the following system of 
equations: 
0
1
,
,
v
k k k k k
v
l a L
L a A B e
α β γ λ ε
η
⎧ = + + + + +⎪⎨ = + + + +⎪⎩
X Y
X Y
      [9] 
where a0 and a1 are between-village averages and the regressors are both (through input use 
and access, food-security and income goals) direct and indirect effects of the characteristics 
on cultivated land and land use. λv and ηv are village fixed effects and and k eε  are error 
terms. 
To represent land changes between any two given years, we write the time-in-difference 
simultaneous model as: 
0
1
,
,
v
k k k k k
v
l b L
L b A B u
α β γ λ μ
η
⎧Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ +⎪⎨Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ +⎪⎩
X Y
X Y
     [10] 
where Δ(.) is the in-difference operator between years t0 and t, assuming transformed 
regressors are constant except for village effects.6 This would typically be the case if cross 
dependence is present across villages, i.e., if initial effects and v vλ η  are not time-
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independent (see, e.g., Baltagi and Pesaran 2007). Error terms and k uμ  may be correlated, 
motivating the joint estimation of the system’s equations. 
Letting i=1,2, …, N denote the (producer’s) household index, equation (10) can be written 
as the following simultaneous-equation model: 
*
1 1 1 1
* *
2 2 1 2 2
,
,
i i
i i i
y u
y y u
δ β
δ γ β
⎧ = + +⎨ = + + +⎩
1i
2i
x
x
     [11] 
where * *1 2 and i iy y  are two latent variables that can be broadly defined as measures of 
profitability associated with two simultaneous decisions. Vectors of explanatory variables 
 and 1i 2ix x  may have some common components (as in (10)); 1 2and i iu u  are error terms with 
1 2( , )i icorr u u ρ= . We assume that the following exogeneity restrictions apply: 
1 2( ) ( ) 0,i iE u E u i= = ∀1i 2ix x . 
In our case, latent variables correspond to changes in the allocation of cotton land and 
total cultivated land, the precise matching of * *1 2and i iy y  to these decisions in (11) above 
depending on assumptions made on the data-generating process. Our structural model implies 
that expansion of land for cotton depends explicitly on total cultivated land given other 
explanatory variables, so that the former corresponds to *2iy , and the latter to
*
1iy . 
 
Estimation of the structural econometric model (11) can be performed with discrete 
variables as dependent variables instead of *1iy  and 
*
2iy , and corresponding to ordered changes 
in land use and land cultivation as reported ex post by farmers. Such retrospective discrete 
variables are preferred to continuous variables (i.e., corresponding to observed latent 
variables) because the latter are likely to be affected by measurement errors.7 In addition, 
GPC records used to track the evolution of total cultivated land cannot be considered accurate. 
Furthermore, the reform implementation and its associated institutional changes took place in 
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the mid-run as a very piecemeal and gradual process. For this reason, assessing the impact of 
the institutional environment on land use only requires information about the average pattern 
on the 1996-2006 period. This can adequately be captured by discrete retrospective variables 
through an ordered classification of the magnitude of farmers’ decisional changes affecting 
land management. 
 
We consider estimation of the system of ordered discrete variables by a bivariate Ordered 
Probit procedure (Sajaia 2007). The derivation of the joint probability for the two latent 
variables is presented in the Appendix. Parameters in the system (11) are identified only if 
exclusion restrictions are imposed, namely at least one variable in 1ix  should be excluded 
from 2ix . An interesting candidate in the determination of change in cultivated land that is not 
correlated with land-use change—and cotton land share—is ethnic origin, once experience in 
cotton growing is controlled for. The shift from GVs to GPCs allowed farmers to access 
inputs independent of their ethnic background, while this remained an important determinant 
for land access, as discussed in section 2. 
Correlation between 1 2and i iu u  implies that
*
1iy  is correlated with 2iu  and therefore the 
second equation in the system of equations (11) cannot be estimated independently. In our 
empirical analysis of joint determination of total farm land and land for cotton, this 
endogeneity issue is indeed crucial. There are two ways of testing for possible endogeneity of 
*
1y  in the equation for 
*
2y  in the system of equations (11) above, determining whether 
constraints in (3) are binding. The first one was proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988) and 
only requires single-equation least squares and (ordered) Probit estimation steps. The second 
possibility consists in estimating the structural system of equations (11) by a bivariate 
(ordered) Probit and then using a Wald test of 0γ =  in the second equation of the system. 
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Sajaia (2007) provides a method for computing such a test in the bivariate ordered Probit 
model, with a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach. 
 
IV.  DATA 
In March 2006, we interviewed 300 cotton-producing households in the south and southwest 
of Burkina Faso. These regions represent 45% of the country’s cotton production, are 
characterized by different historical backgrounds and heterogeneous production dynamics 
over the period of the reform. However, the dynamics of aggregate cotton output from these 
regions is similar to the national pattern. 
Five zones with similar ethnological and linguistic characteristics were chosen, with four 
villages selected in each. Households were randomly selected in each stratum (according to 
cotton areas in the previous cropping season), proportional to the size of the stratum. Only 
households involved (even marginally) in cotton production were interviewed. Some farmers 
have abandoned cotton production over the period but, according to national statistics, these 
farmers are few and very hard to identify within villages of cotton growers. Thus, even though 
our study may overestimate the increase in cotton areas, the selection bias is expected to be 
fairly small, and we address this issue below. 
 
The questionnaire was designed with retrospective questions about the evolution of 
agricultural systems, the institutional and technical environment, and economic decisions 
within each household in the period 1996-2006. The empirical analysis applies to a dynamic 
process (changes in cotton area and cultivated land) but with cross-sectional data collected 10 
years after the reform started in the cotton sector. As discussed above, in order to limit the 
impact of measurement errors and recall problems inherent to retrospective questions, we 
 18
consider ordered discrete variables as proxies for the changes in total cultivated land and in 
cotton land share.8 
Farmers were first asked about total cultivated land and land for cotton, both before the 
reform and for the year 2006. This information was compared to the GPC records and 
discussed before validation. Two ordered discrete variables were then constructed with non-
overlapping intervals for the magnitude of changes in cotton land share (5 classes, from large 
decrease to large increase) and total cultivated land (6 classes, from decrease to increase by 
more than 5 ha). Data were also obtained on agricultural production for the year 2006 (planted 
area and yield for most crops including cotton, seed, fertilizer and pesticide), with some 
variables also available at the country level for comparison (DGPSA, 2006). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Descriptive statistics on the changes in cotton land share and total cultivated land are 
presented in Table 1, and on crop yields and inputs in Table 2. Two-thirds of the households9 
increased their cultivated land during the reform and/or increased their cotton land share. 
Average crop yields and input use for cotton are fairly close to country-level data (DGPSA 
2006). The variability in crop yields is mostly due to heterogeneity in fertilizer application 
rates, access to inputs, soil fertility and experience with cotton production. On average, 
farmers apply far more nitrogen fertilizer on cotton than on other crops, which partly reflects 
the relative profitability of cotton with respect to other crops, and the facts that input access is 
conditioned on growing cotton and that input diversion to other crops has become more 
difficult. However, input use for other crops is larger than the country average, because GPCs 
are now able to provide their members with cereal input credit. The average cotton land share 
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is slightly more than 50%, compared to around 30% before the reform in the same region 
(DGPSA 2006). 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Households were then asked about the determinants of their decisions, in particular, the 
degree to which income and food-security goals mattered. First, they reported the three most 
important determinants to them of land use, and rated each determinant on a [0,10] scale. 
Farmers were then asked whether other determinants were also significant and if it was the 
case, they were asked to rate them according to their stated ordered preferences.10 
Determinants of decisions include profitability of agricultural production, financial and food 
needs, guarantee of selling crops, input access and payment date. We now present the 
motivation behind the introduction of these determinants and we discuss the construction of 
the corresponding explanatory variables. Some are obtained from observed variables for the 
year of the sample (revealed determinants), while others are reported retrospectively by 
farmers and are denoted stated determinants. Stated determinants therefore refer to the 
perception of households at the period of the survey, about the leading factors that affected 
their production choices over the past 10 years, i.e., since the beginning of the reform. 
Combining stated and revealed determinants enabled us to use the most relevant information 
pertaining to the contractual environment of farmers and to institutional performance, as well 
as eliciting income and food security constraints affecting land-use choices. 
 
The first two determinants are related to the profitability of cotton production, and are 
captured by the (stated) households’ concern about the relative price of cotton with respect to 
cereals on the one hand, the (revealed) present intensity of mineral fertilizer use on cotton 
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compared to other crops on the other. For the first one, both the level of the price ratio and its 
variability were considered, to capture farmer attitudes toward risk. For the second 
determinant, we consider both the absolute and the relative input use. While absolute input 
use is supposedly correlated with land-use through profitability incentives such as identified 
in the (unconstrained) optimization problem of the conceptual model, constrained access to 
inputs may modify this relationship. Because input access is easier for cotton than cereals, 
relative input use will be used as a control variable for the two input-availability constraints in 
(3). 
 
The profit-risk profile of crops is represented by exogenous characteristics such as climate 
variability (captured by village effects), technical knowledge and technical assistance, 
experience in cotton growing (revealed), input access, outlet guarantees, and payment date. 
We control for the social environment of farmers through dummies on the quality of 
relationships with the GPC (stated), and we introduce a dummy variable to control for 
household heads who did not have pre-reform experience (less than 28 years old in 2006). 
Technical knowledge and changes in agricultural labor and capital may also influence the 
pattern of land extension when adopting animal traction. We therefore consider variables 
reflecting changes in both familial and village labor force (revealed), as well as a technology 
dummy (revealed) for the adoption of animal-drawn farming. The opportunity cost of 
agricultural activity is proxied by off-farm income (revealed). 
 
As the reform period covers 10 years, the answers to the recall questions may cover 
different periods of time, reflecting the farmers’ particular experiences. To address this point, 
we control for age and education of the household’s head (revealed) and for experience in 
cotton growing (also included in household characteristics for profit-risk profile of crops). 
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The latter also enables us to isolate the effect of ethnic origin on land access as an instrument 
in the estimation strategy, and to control for the effects of experience on land-use evolution 
with respect to cotton growing. Experience in cotton growing (revealed) is a necessary and 
important control variable for cotton growers who started producing during the cotton reform, 
and at different moments from the time of the interview. As stated above, experience is also 
controlling for heterogeneous social group dynamics and input access.11 
 
Two additional (revealed) variables are used as instruments in the equation of land-
cultivation change: a dummy for households belonging to resident ethnic groups and duration 
of residence in the village. The latter enables us to distinguish between already-settled ethnic 
minorities and migrants. Other control variables include village fixed effects and an index of 
risk aversion. The relative risk aversion index is between 0 and 1 and is computed as follows. 
Farmers were asked to report the minimum monetary deposit they would request from an 
unknown trader in advance to sell him their harvest (arbitrarily set at a value of 100,000 
FCFA). They had to choose between the lottery where they would be paid twice by this 
trader, with 50 percent probability of not being paid at all (only the deposit), and the one with 
their regular trader assumed to pay them with certainty. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on qualitative variables representing changes in land 
use and land cultivation (total cultivated land, cotton land share) as well as agricultural 
production technology, cotton experience, resident ethnic group, relationships with GPC, and 
if the household’s head is more than 28 years old. From the ordered discrete variables of land 
changes (total land and cotton land share), we constructed two dummy variables 
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corresponding to a large increase in cotton land share (42 percent of the sample, 
corresponding to modality 5 of the ordered variable) and a large increase in total cultivated 
land (27 percent, corresponding to modalities 4, 5 and 6 of the ordered variable). Regarding 
production technology, most households in the sample have adopted animal traction during 
the period of the reform (60 percent). Half of them have more than 10 years experience in 
cotton growing, meaning that they were producing cotton before the reform. This is confirmed 
by the fact that 81 percent of the household heads were more than 18 years old when the 
reform started. The population of resident ethnic groups is larger than the migrant one in the 
sample (about 60 percent), and a large majority of households have a satisfactory to good 
relationship with the GPC (almost 90 percent). 
 
Descriptive statistics on quantitative variables, including revealed and stated determinants 
of land-use choices, are presented in Table 4. The average farmer in the sample was already 
of working age when the reform started in 1996 but was born elsewhere (residence duration in 
the village less than age). Concerning agricultural inputs, farmers apply twice as much 
fertilizer on cotton than on other crops, and the family labor has been increased by more than 
3 units on average over the period of the reform (10 years), to which one should add 
additional labor force from the village which increased by 2 units on average. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
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V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Selection Bias and Specification Tests 
We estimate the system of equations (11) according to three different specifications: a) single-
equation ordered Probit for each equation in the system; b) bivariate ordered Probit (FIML) I ; 
c) bivariate ordered Probit (FIML) II. In specification a), equations are estimated separately 
and all explanatory variables are assumed exogenous. The Rivers-Vuong test of the null 
assumption of exogeneity for the other ordered discrete variable (change in total land in the 
equation of change in cotton land share and vice versa) is performed. In specification b), the 
system is estimated under the same exogeneity assumption as in case a), and the correlation 
coefficient between random terms in both equations is estimated. Finally, specification c) 
entails joint estimation of both equations by explicitly accounting for the endogeneity of the 
other ordered discrete variable on the right-hand side. Estimation results are in Tables 5a 
(change in cotton land share) and 5b (change in total cultivated land). Before we discuss 
parameter estimates and specification test results in more detail, we need to address the issue 
of selection bias. 
 
With about 50 percent of new entrants (who did not grow cotton prior to the reform), the 
induced change in the composition of cotton farmers might entail biased estimation of the 
system of equations (11). Controlling for cotton experience enables us however to account for 
the change in the distribution of cotton households during the reform and for newcomers to 
the cotton sector. Nevertheless, we do not have information on farmers who exited 
production, which could lead to a selection problem, as already stressed above (see Brambilla 
and Porto 2005). 
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We now show that selection is not a significant issue for exiting farmers, accounting for a 
representative proportion of households (6 percent) who exited cotton production during the 
reform, on which we have information (from village visits and interviews with non-cotton 
households and local authorities). We introduce a new value for the cotton experience 
variable, which corresponds to the farmers who exited production,12 and we estimate a Probit 
selection equation, controlling for the endogeneity bias with the Rivers-Vuong residuals. We 
show (see appendix Table A1) that the Heckman Probit estimates (Heckman 1979) are not 
significantly different from the Probit estimates for two binary choices: significant increase in 
cultivated land and large increase in cotton land share. Thus, the selection problem is not 
really important here, as attested by the non-rejection (with a Wald test) of the assumption of 
independent equations of the two Heckman Probit models. We therefore conclude that exit 
more likely concerned households with older heads, higher off-farm current income, or 
troubles within their former GPCs. 
 
Let us now turn to specification tests on the model, addressing the issue of endogeneity 
and correlation across land-use change equations. To address the endogeneity issue, we first 
compute the Rivers-Vuong test statistic from the single-equation ordered Probit specification 
a). We then compute the Wald test statistic under the null assumption of exogeneity of the 
change in land-use variable in the bivariate-ordered equations (FIML I). Both exogeneity test 
statistics allow us to reject the null assumption of exogeneity of the change in total cultivated 
land in the equation for cotton. Hence, our prediction of an endogenous change in cultivated 
land in (10) is supported by the data, meaning that (binding) constraints on land access 
effectively impact land-use decisions. In the case of the total cultivated land equation 
however, exogeneity of cotton land share is not rejected by both specification tests. 
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As can be seen in Tables 5a and 5b, correlation among residuals of the two equations of 
(10) is negative and significant, which gives support to the bivariate specification and to the 
simultaneous nature of data-generating processes. Concerning the ordered Probit 
specifications FIML I and FIML II, since more than two cut-off values are found to be 
significant in each case and for each equation, the ordered discrete specification is preferred to 
the binary discrete-choice model (as in Table A1). We therefore concentrate on the estimates 
of the bivariate ordered Probit specification with the change in total cultivated land as an 
endogenous variable in the determination of land-use changes for cotton (Bivariate Ordered 
Probit FIML II). 
 
Bivariate Ordered Probit Estimation Results 
 
[Tables 5a and 5b here] 
  
In our interpretation of the role of “statement of importance” variables on land-use decisions, 
we should keep in mind that we actually identify relationships between households’ 
determinants including subjective concerns and reported agricultural production decisions in 
the form of land-use changes. Although we do not directly estimate the impact of institutional 
features on our variables of interest, analyzing the significance of these determinants is 
insightful to assess how farmers responded to institutional changes. Regarding the 
interpretation of stated importance variables in cotton and total cultivated land equations, we 
do not identify the actual impact of a particular determinant itself on land-use decisions, but 
we match variations in land-use decisions across farmers with variations in the stated 
importance of this determinant. Therefore, stated-importance determinants have to be 
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interpreted differently from “revealed” ones (experience, etc.), from which the direct effect on 
land-use decisions can be identified. 
 
Consider first the concern about the relative price of cotton with respect to cereals. 
Estimation results from Table 5a reveal that the stated importance of relative prices did not 
matter much for cotton land-use patterns over the reform period. In a process of land 
extension, price concerns matter less when cultivated land increases, according to (4). But we 
also know that all farmers experienced the same changes in the purchase price of seed cotton 
and in cotton inputs, so that little can be said about the true impact of prices on land-use 
decisions. However, cereal prices differ greatly across villages and cropping seasons, so that 
there is potential heterogeneity in the relative prices experienced by farmers. In this case, the 
non-significance of the “stated price” variable only means that the households’ responsiveness 
to relative prices was not crucial when allocating land to cotton. In contrast, the stated concern 
about “relative price variability” is significant, meaning that households were sensitive to crop 
prices’ volatility. 
Input and land uses are expected to be positively correlated because of profitability 
incentives, as shown by the comparative statics of the conceptual model (see appendix). We 
can therefore proxy relative crop profitability by input use, everything else held constant. As 
can be seen from Table 5a, absolute input use (revealed) is not significant either in the 
equation for cotton land-use, but it is significant in the equation of total cultivated land (Table 
5b). Furthermore, the non-significance of relative input use indicates that constraints on input 
access in (3) are not currently binding on average. Hence, we can conjecture that relative 
cotton profitability did not directly affect land use through incentives on crop allocation and 
input use. 
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All other things being equal, the impact of an increase in total cultivated land on cotton 
land share is positive and significant, so that the food-security constraint may be less likely to 
bind with land extension, and it is also consistent with cash-income goals once food security 
has been achieved, as in (5). The stated determinant “concern about financial goal” is not 
significant, which is interpreted as a non-binding income goal constraint in (3). 
The most striking results in Table 5a are the role of the institutional environment of 
smallholders in accessing market and agricultural contracts through cotton, and the degree of 
technical assistance (measured by the number of visits by extension agents). The stated 
importance of accessing inputs in land-use choices, having guaranteed outlets (and thereby 
access to output markets) and the payment date are significant and positively correlated with 
increases in cotton land share. Hence, the improvement of contractual relationships in the 
cotton sector might explain the observed change in land use, having a greater impact on the 
most sensitive—and possibly formerly constrained (liquidity, access to input and output 
markets, and to land)—farmers. This supports the gradual establishment of better market 
arrangements among producers and between farmers and cotton firms, with the limitation of 
food needs as the key mechanism of cotton expansion. These arrangements would have, in 
turn, slackened the constraints on input credit access, income and liquidity, and food needs. 
The date of payment for the seed cotton (early in the season, compared to other crops), the 
importance of accessing inputs and the guarantee of selling all production at once for a 
predetermined price appear to have been major determinants in land-use decisions for cotton. 
Multiplying the estimated coefficient by the average level of the corresponding explanatory 
variable, we can compare the average magnitude of farmers’ responsiveness to stated 
determinants regarding land use. The most important effect is due to outlet guarantees 
(0.183), followed by input access (0.147) and stabilized price of seed cotton (0.092), while 
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payment date is far behind (0.04). Stated importance of food-security objectives was an 
important limitation (-0.12).  
Under the financial streamlining that occurred within the cotton sector, the new 
institutional arrangements between ginners and farmers involved an earlier payment of the 
seed cotton and a more timely and accessible delivery of agricultural inputs. Increasing the 
share of family agricultural business under outgrower schemes reflects less risky strategies 
undertaken by farmers to satisfy their income goal, compared to other crops whose payments 
arrive later in the crop season. For those crops, marketing is more risky and involves many 
stakeholders with no guarantee of selling production at a good (and stable) price, resulting in 
a more difficult access to inputs. Hence, lower marketing risk for cotton might have driven 
part of the observed outcomes on land-use changes. 
Technical assistance has limited an overly large increase in cotton land use, as a means of 
reducing financial risks for cotton firms and cotton-producing households, in the case of 
incomplete or missing rural insurance markets to cover production risks. It was the opposite in 
the past when extension agents were sent by the government under a national strategy of 
cotton promotion. The delegation of extension services to the private sector was associated 
with more concern about marketing profitability and the financial risks involved in the 
outgrower schemes for input credit. The quality of the GPC relationships is not significant in 
the evolution of land use. This may be why it has become easier to change groups for 
unsatisfied producers, thereby enabling input credit to be more equally distributed. 
Consequently, the GPC institutional innovation may have slackened the social constraint on 
land-use choices in favor of cotton. 
 
Turning now to the change in total cultivated land (Table 5b), the evolution patterns of 
family labor force and mechanization appear to be strong determinants for households, as 
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indicated by estimated parameters of technology dummies (traditional farming, adoption of 
animal-traction since less or more than 10 years). Already-equipped farmers were more likely 
to increase their cultivated land than those who became equipped during the reform, and much 
more than those who are still cropping in a conventional fashion (no animal traction). Note 
that the increase in the village labor force (slackening of labor shortage constraints) also plays 
a significant role in the general pattern of cultivated land increase, while technical assistance 
has no significant impact.  
Ethnic origin also explains better access to land for resident ethnic groups than for other 
groups, when experience in cotton growing and the duration of village residence are 
accounted for. The use of ethnic origin as an instrument for endogenous change in total 
cultivated land is therefore justified. Among other control variables in Table 5b, absolute 
input use (on cotton) is negative and significant, while the stated effects of relative price of 
cotton and input access are positive and significant. Indeed, the relative price of cotton, 
application of inputs to cotton, and input access are also components of overall land 
profitability and risk profiles. In addition, the most efficient smallholders in terms of input use 
on cotton, and the most constrained in terms of input access may be less interested in land 
extension in general, for scale efficiency for the former (diversification prospects) and 
possible food-security reasons for the latter. Although relative prices and profitability 
components might not have mattered directly for land-use changes, it is likely that more 
profitable cotton contributed to cultivated land extension in general. Since land cultivation is 
positively correlated with the change in the cotton land share, relative profitability, in turn, 
affected land-use decisions through this channel. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper addresses the problem of agricultural land use by smallholders in a very 
constrained environment due to market incompleteness. Taking the case of cotton expansion 
during the Burkinabè cotton reform, we propose a structural model of land use accounting for 
incomplete or missing markets, as well as endogenous cultivated land, in the determination of 
optimal land use. 
We show that market issues (price and inputs) may not matter directly for land-use 
decisions because of endogenous constraints internalized by households arising from market 
incompleteness: food security, income goal, social arrangements for land access, and 
restricted access to agricultural inputs. However, the profitability of cotton contributed to the 
growth of overall cultivated land, having a positive indirect effect on the growth of cotton 
land share. Controlling for household-specific characteristics, we point out that easier access 
to inputs, receiving early cash payments, and benefiting from outlet guarantees explain the 
direct and significant changes in land-use patterns in favor of cotton during the cotton reform 
in Burkina Faso. 
Better institutional arrangements have driven the potential for cotton production in 
Burkina Faso, through more incentives for land use that favors cotton and also via indirect 
effects—through labor and capital investment, and better allocation of factors—for land 
cultivation. Our estimation results reveal that the free-adhesion principle for cotton groups 
(GPCs) has enabled farmers not to be constrained by the quality of their group when taking on 
their land-use decisions. Altogether, this has substantially decreased the risk profile of cotton 
relative to other crops, while the increase in total cultivated land has secured farmers in terms 
of their food-security objectives.  
Recent difficulties faced by the Burkinabè cotton sector reveal however that extensive 
cotton production is not sustainable in the long run if cotton firms and banks can no longer 
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recover their loans, and if governance is an issue (Kaminski and Bambio 2009). Declining 
world cotton prices, increasing input prices, mismanagement of the smoothing fund, and 
poorer management of cotton firms were responsible for a lower institutional performance in 
the recent years. The deficits experienced by cotton firms have resulted in new difficulties in 
paying farmers (with adverse agro-climatic conditions) in a timely manner and in providing 
them with cereal inputs. This puts forth the idea that, under market incompleteness, marketing 
crops is highly sensitive to the institutional performance of the cotton sector. Further research 
efforts would be necessary to empirically analyze the underlying mechanisms of the recent 
drop in production. 
 
Because it was achieved through extensive land use, the current growth in seed cotton 
production cannot be sustained in the long run. A policy-led intensification of farming 
systems is then expected, which could be based on the same institutional mechanisms as those 
of the cotton reform; namely, the involvement and empowerment of producers in the political 
process together with a sufficient degree of market coordination among stakeholders. 
Meanwhile, it will require improvements in governance and accountability of cotton 
executives and rural leaders (Kaminski et al. 2009).  
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APPENDIX 
 
Derivation of the structural land equations 
 
To obtain equations (3), we maximize the expression (2) with respect to each land share kl of 
crop k, and each input quantity applied to this crop xkj. With respect to the land share, we have: 
( ) 2( , ) [ ( ) 2 ] 2 ( )²k k k k k k k k k
k
V l x L E x c L l L l x
l
π γ σ λ∂ = − − =∂     [A.1] 
where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint of (2), and 
( )2( , ) ( ) ( )² 0k k k k k kk k
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π σγ∂ ∂ ∂= − =∂ ∂ ∂ ,     [A.2] 
with respect to the input quantity applied to crop k. Rearranging terms yields:  
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Assuming that profit variance decreases with input application implies that more risk-averse 
farmers are willing to apply more input, everything equal. Because 1k
k
l =∑  at the optimum 
(binding constraint), λ  is different from 0. From (A.3) we get: 
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Plugging this expression into (A.3), we obtain an explicit form of the optimal land share of 
crop k: 
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which is a measure of the relative risk-profitability of crop k with respect to all crops. 
Partial differentiation of (3) gives the following expressions: 
*
1
1
1
*
( ) ( )11
2 ( )² ( )²1 1[ ]
( )² ( )² ( )²[ ]²
( )²
² ( ) ( )² ( ) ² ( )²
² ²1
( )²[ ]
K
k k i i
K
ik i i i k k
K
ik k kkj i i i k k k kj
i i i i
k k k k k k k k
kj kj kj kjk
k kkj
kj
E x E x
l L c x x
c xx c x c x x
c x
E x x E x x
x x x xl
xx L
x
π π
γσ σγγσ γσ γσ
γσ
π σ π σ
σγ
=
=
=
−+∂ + ∂= − −+∂ + + ∂
+
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂−∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ = ∂∂
∂
∑ ∑∑
²
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 [A.5] 
Profit variance is decreasing and convex with input use, so both expressions are 
unambiguously positive. Land shares and input uses are thus positively correlated, everything 
being equal. Note that when the total amount of cultivated land hL  is very large, then: 
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that is, land use only depends on relative land cultivation costs and relative profit variance 
among crops. The land use/input use correlation is also weakening with cultivated land. 
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The Bivariate Ordered Probit Model 
 
Let { }1[ , ] , 1,2, , ; 1, 2k k kj j j kS c c j J k−= = =…  denote a series of sets, 
with , 1, 2kj
j
S k= ∀ =\∪ , and such that 0 1, , ,  and c , ,Kk k k kJ j jc c k c k j−= −∞ = ∞ ∀ ≤ ∀ ∀ . We observe 
the following ordered dependent variables: 
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From the structural model (11), we have: 
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where ( )2 .,.,.Φ  is the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 
( ) ( )1/ 221 2 , θ γρ γ ρ θ γ ρ−= + + = + . The formula for the probability of any pair (j, k) can be used 
to construct the log-likelihood of the sample, and to obtain consistent maximum likelihood 
estimates of the bivariate ordered Probit model (see Sajaia, 2007). 1 2 2J J+ −  cut-off values 
( kjc ) are estimated together with parameters 1 2( , , , )β β γ ρ , but intercept terms 1 2and δ δ  are 
not identified (equivalently, cut-offs are only identified up to a constant term). 
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Table A1.  Binary Probit estimates with selection effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10 %, **significant at 5 %, ***significant at 1 
%. The Rivers-Vuong tests are used to test for endogeneity of the change in total cultivated land and cotton land 
share. 
Dependent variable Large increase in cotton land share = Y1 Significant increase in total cultivated 
land = Y2 
 Binary Probit 1 Heckman Probit 1 Binary Probit 2 Heckman 
Probit2 
Relative price  .025   (.029) .024   (.029) .018   (.046) .015   (.057) 
Relative price variability -.047   (.035) -.049   (.035) .066   (.048) .061   (.047) 
Financial goal  -.024    (.028) -.021    (.027) .049   (.033) .043   (.033) 
Food-security goal -.037   (.025) -.037   (.025) .057   (.043) .052   (.042) 
Guarantee of selling .062   (.032)** .065   (.032)** -.086   (.058) -.090   (.068) 
Input access .056   (.029)** .054   (.029)* .102   (.041)*** .090   (.046)** 
Payment date .048   (.065) .050   (.064) -.288   (.105)*** -.272   (.103)*** 
Technical assistance -.046    (.016)*** -.047    (.016)*** .058   (.028)** .060   (.028)** 
Past technical assistance .074    (.033)** .080    (.033)** -.021   (.049) -.029   (.049) 
Change in family labor force -.010   (.037) -.015   (.037) .071   (.033)** .068   (.084) 
Change in village labor force  .004   (.042) -.001   (.041) .090   (.037)** .083   (.062) 
Animal traction< 10 years 
Traditional farming 
Animal traction > 10 years 
-.004   (.320) 
Reference 
-.612   (.542) 
-.018   (.318) 
Reference 
-.614   (.540) 
1.038   (.428)*** 
Reference 
1.635   (.483)*** 
1.141   (.513)** 
Reference 
1.651   (.511)*** 
Y2 or Y1 (resp.) 2.349    (1.054)** 2.468    (1.063)** 1.735   (1.419) 1.784   (1.398) 
Ethnic resident group - - .433   (.249)* .112   (.585) 
Duration of residence - - .003   (.007) .001   (.008) 
Off-farm income -.002   (.003) .001   (.003) .003   (.003) .004   (.005) 
Risk aversion -1.033   (.638)* -1.010   (.638) .581   (.876) .560   (1.486) 
Relative input -.138   (.106) -.142   (.105) -.036   (.133) -.005   (.158) 
Age .007   (.012) -.002   (.012) .014   (.014) .026   (.016)* 
New cotton grower 1.210   (.480)*** 1.198   (.468)*** -.633   (.733) -.622   (.559) 
Cotton experience <3 y .030  (.447) .003  (.446) -.426   (.646) -.301   (.743) 
Cotton experience <5 y .789   (.318)*** .776   (.321)** -.621   (.413) -.478   (1.409) 
Cotton experience < 10 y .547   (.218)*** .550   (.217)*** -.012   (.273) .003   (.318) 
Cotton grower >10 y Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Village effects Included Included Included Included 
Education dummies Included Included Included Included 
GPC dummies Not significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Rivers-Vuong endogeneity test  -2.577   (1.064)** -2.672   (1.072)*** -1.976   (1.450) -1.966   (1.338) 
Constant -1.533   (1.536)** -1.171   (1.040) -4.186   (1.194)*** -3.375   (3.236) 
Wald Chi² 118.75*** 124.14*** 119.45*** 176.69*** 
Pseudo R²   .258 .408 .494 .507 
Observations 300 318 300 318 
Selection equation: Growing cotton in 
2006 (no exit during the reform)  
Heckman Probit 1 Heckman Probit 2 
Resident ethnic group  .683   (.139)*** .786   (.441)* 
Off-farm income -.006   (.003)* -.006   (.005) 
Transfers -.088   (.051)* -.090   (.197)* 
Age -.062   (.023)*** -.059   (.036)* 
GPC relationships: very good 7.790   (1.902)*** 7.790   (3.902) 
GPC relationships: satisfactory 2.086   (.0336)*** 2.030   (3.516) 
GPC relationships: not good .969   (.401)** .820   (3.170) 
GPC relationships: very bad reference reference 
Constant 2.410   (1.018)** 2.311   (2.304) 
Wald-test of independent equations 0.49 0.19 
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Table 1. Changes in total cultivated land and in cotton land share 
 
 Change in cotton land share  
Change in total cultivated land Large 
increase 
Moderate 
increase 
No change Moderate 
decrease 
Large 
decrease 
Total 
number of 
households 
Decreased 3 7 2 1 0 13 
Remained constant 23 26 30 5 1 85 
Increased < 2 ha 56 41 19 4 0 120 
Increased [2, 3] ha 18 15 3 2 0 38 
Increased [3, 5] ha 13 5 0 4 0 22 
Increased > 5 ha 14 6 1 1 0 22 
Total number of households 127 100 55 17 1 300 
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Table 2. Agricultural production statistics, 2006 
 
 Observations: 300       
Cotton Total Mean 
Std. 
deviation Min Max 
 
Country 
level 
Planted area (ha) 1092.75 3.67 3.52 0.5 25 675,000 
Seed cotton output (kg) 1,206,266 4034.33 5083.97 201 49,640 710,000 
Yield (kg/ ha)  1037.17 359.94 201 2073.33 1050 
Urea (kg/ ha)  68.85 52.13 0 533.33 62.4 
Chemical fertilizer (kg/ ha)  110.77 60.53 0 600 103.7 
Organic fertilizer (kg/ ha)  13.40 65.43 0 1000 - 
Pesticide (liter/ ha)  5.39 2.36 0 24 4.92 
Other crops       
Planted area (ha) 985.95 3.29 1.33 1 15 - 
Urea (kg/ ha)  18.32 34.58 0 250 7.2 
Chemical fertilizer (kg / ha)  27.17 52.07 0 400 12.8 
Organic fertilizer (kg/ ha)  21.67 105.78 0 1600 - 
Pesticide (liter/ ha)  0.15 0.77 0 8.67 0.0 
 
Note. Country-level data are obtained from the permanent agriculture survey data (DGPSA, 2006). 
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Table 3. Description of qualitative variables 
 
Variable Description Relative 
frequency 
Change in cotton land 
share 
1 if cotton land share has greatly decreased (more than 15% of the current 
amount of cultivated land over all cultivated land) during the reform 
2 if cotton land share has moderately decreased (less than 15%) 
3 if cotton land share has remained constant 
4 if cotton land share has moderately increased (less than 15%) 
5 if cotton land share has increased by more than 15% 
0.003 
 
0.057 
0.183 
0.33 
0.423 
Large increase in 
cotton land share 
1 if the household has experienced a large increase in the cotton land share 
during the reform: additional cotton land share represents at least 15% of the 
present cultivated land 
0.423 
Change in total 
cultivated land  
1 if cultivated land area has decreased during the reform         
2 if cultivated land area has remained constant 
3 if cultivated land area has increased less than 2 ha 
4 if cultivated land area has increased between 2 and 3 ha 
5 if cultivated land area has increased between 3 and 5 ha 
6 if cultivated land area has increased more than 5 ha 
0.043 
0.283 
0.4 
0.127 
0.073 
0.073 
Large increase in total 
cultivated land  
1 if the household has experienced an increase in cultivated land of more than 
3 ha during the reform 
0.273 
Agricultural 
technology 
=1 if the household has adopted animal-traction farming during the reform 
=2 if the household has a traditional technology 
=3 if the household has adopted animal-traction farming before the reform 
0.607 
0.197 
0.197 
Cotton experience 1 if new cotton grower 
2 if less than three years experience with cotton growing 
3 if  less than five years experience with cotton growing 
4 if less than ten years experience with cotton growing 
5 if more than ten years experience (growing cotton before the reform) 
0.033 
0.093 
0.143 
0.24 
0.49 
Resident ethnic group 1 if the household belongs to a resident (in contrast to a migrant) ethnic group  0.603 
Relationship with 
Group of Cotton 
Producers (GPC) 
1 if good 
2 if satisfactory 
3 if unpleasant 
4 if very bad 
0.347 
0.55 
0.09 
0.013 
More than 28 1 if the household’s head is more than or 28 years old (i.e., more than 18 years 
old at the beginning of the reform) 
0.81 
Note. 300 observations. 
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Table 4. Description of quantitative variables 
 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
deviation 
 Objective (“revealed”) determinants   
Age Age of the household’s head 34 8.08 
Duration of residence Duration of residence in the village (in years) 19.46 15.29 
Technical  assistance level Number of visits of  technical advisors in 2005/2006 2.95 5.69 
Past technical assistance level Number of visits of technical advisors in 1996 1.95 2.84 
Risk aversion Relative risk aversion index for a harvest value of 100,000 FCFA 0.71 .021 
Off-farm income Household off-farm income in thousands FCFA per head 13.5 29.0 
Transfers Household received transfers in thousands FCFA per head .48     2.54 
Absolute input Quantity of total mineral fertilizers in Kg applied per cultivated 
hectare of cotton 
179.02 86.26 
Relative input Ratio of total mineral fert*ilizers applied on cotton/other crops per 
hectare 
2.07 1.24 
Change in family labor force Increase in family labor force during the reform (full-time working 
units) 
3.24 3.53 
Change in village labor force Increase in village labor force units working at the household’s 
plots during the reform (full-time labor units) 
2.03 2.81 
 Subjective (“stated”) determinants (rated by importance)   
Relative price Importance of prices in deciding crop allocation to land  4.12 3.81 
Relative price variability Importance of price fluctuations in deciding crop allocation to land 2.3 3.17 
Financial needs Importance of financial needs in deciding crop allocation to land 3.57 3.69 
Food needs Importance of food needs in deciding crop allocation to land 2.61 3.18 
Guarantee of selling Importance of guarantee of selling crops in deciding crop allocation 
to land 
2.78 3.44 
Input access Importance of access to inputs in deciding crop allocation to land 2.95 2.53 
Payment date Importance of crop payment dates in deciding crop allocation to 
land 
0.36 1.49 
 
Note. 300 observations. “Stated” determinants are rated by households in order of importance on a scale [0, 10]. 
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Table 5a. Ordered discrete-choice model estimates for the change in cotton land share 
 
 
Notes. 300 observations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10 %, **significant at 5 %, 
***significant at 1 %. The Rivers-Vuong test is used to test for endogeneity of the change in total cultivated 
land.  
 
Change in cotton land share  Single-equation 
ordered Probit 
Bivariate ordered 
Probit 
(FIML) I 
Bivariate ordered 
Probit 
(FIML) II 
Relative price  .026   (.023) .033   (.022) .008   (.022) 
Relative price variability -.030   (.026) -.029   (.025) -.040   (.022)* 
Financial goal  -.010    (.023) -.006   (.023) -.006   (.024) 
Food-security goal -.061   (.023)*** -.058   (.026)** -.052   (.024)** 
Guarantee of selling .054   (.026)** .057   (.026)** .066   (.026)*** 
Input access .057   (.022)*** .062   (.022)*** .050   (.025)** 
Payment date .100   (.052)** .112   (.050)** .118   (.052)** 
Technical assistance level -.038    (.012)*** -.039   (.013)*** -.041   (.013)*** 
Past technical assistance level  .088    (.027)*** .084   (.026)*** .077   (.027)*** 
Change in family labor force -.036   (.034) -.027   (.025) .003   (.037) 
Change in village labor force  .013   (.036) .052   (.030)* .039   (.037) 
Adopted animal traction < 10 years 
Traditional farming 
Adopted animal traction (>10 years) 
.149   (.259) 
Reference 
-.050   (.352) 
.386   (.230)* 
Reference 
.550   (.269)** 
-.050   (.205) 
Reference 
.135   (.306) 
Change in total cultivated land .458    (.204)** - .323   (.121)*** 
Off-farm income -.002   (.003) -.002   (.003) -.001   (.003) 
Risk aversion -.486   (.508) -.398   (.501) -.355   (.504) 
Absolute input - - .001   (.001) 
Relative input -.116   (.091) -.110   (.086) -.123   (.084) 
Age .002   (.009) .001   (.009) .002   (.011) 
More than 28 - - -.045   (.231) 
New cotton grower 744   (.452)* 585   (.464) .590   (.472) 
Cotton experience <3 years -.090  (.268) -.175  (.264) -.173   (.272) 
Cotton experience <5 years .425   (.232)* .403   (.229)* .352   (.223)* 
Cotton experience < 10 years .135   (.190) .205   (.182) .095   (.186) 
Cotton grower >10 years Reference Reference Reference 
Village effects Included Included Included 
Education dummies Included Included Included 
GPC dummies Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Rivers-Vuong endogeneity test  -.523   (.220)** - - 
Cut-off 1 -1.606   (833)** -2.085   (.779)*** -1.535   (.859)** 
Cut-off  2 -.272   (.751) -.752   (.725) -.260   (.777) 
Cut-off  3 .743   (.745) .366   (.718) .716   (.756) 
Cut-off  4 1.858 (.746)*** 1.371   (.719)** 1.786   (.748)*** 
Wald Chi² 136.83*** 131.39*** 148.35*** 
Pseudo R²   .142 .226 .248 
ρ (correlation between equations) - .024   (.081) -.243   (.115)** 
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Table 5b. Ordered-choice model estimates for the change in total cultivated land 
 
 
Notes. 300 observations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10 %, **significant at 5 %, 
***significant at 1 %. The Rivers-Vuong test is used to test for endogeneity of the change in cotton land share. 
 
Change in total cultivated land Single-equation 
ordered Probit 
Bivariate ordered 
Probit (FIML) I 
Bivariate ordered 
Probit (FIML) II 
Relative price  .044   (.027)* .027   (.025) .051   (.025)** 
Relative price variability .011   (.032) .030   (.027) -.012   (.026) 
Financial goal  .006   (.019) .005   (.021) .011   (.021) 
Food-security goal .034   (.030) .044   (.024)* .038   (.024) 
Guarantee of selling -.042   (.031) -.019   (.024) -.029   (.024) 
Input access .036   (.029) .072   (.022)*** .065   (.022)*** 
Payment date -.103   (.047)** -.056   (.054) -.070   (.057) 
Technical assistance level .013   (.017) .008   (.008) .009   (.008) 
Past technical assistance level -.047   (.032) .009   (.025) .014   (.025) 
Change in family labor force .208   (.024)*** .190   (.025)*** .190   (.025)*** 
Change in village labor force  .129   (.027)*** .136   (.026)*** .148   (.025)*** 
Adopted animal traction < 10 years .771   (.187)*** .663   (.207)*** .703   (.213)*** 
Traditional farming Reference Reference Reference 
Adopted animal traction (>10 years) 1.200   (.266)*** .953   (.302)*** 1.049   (.295)*** 
Change in cotton land share .415    (.403) - - 
Off-farm income -.002   (.002) .000   (.002) -.001   (.002) 
Risk aversion -.192   (.381) .004   (.489) .033   (.486) 
Absolute input - - -.003   (.001)*** 
Relative input .001   (.009) .011   (.010) .034   (.097) 
Age .001   (.009) .005   (.010) .000   (.011) 
More than 28 years old - - .132   (.228) 
New cotton grower -.229   (.398) -.081   (.355) -.212   (.363) 
Cotton experience <3 years -.191   (.287) -.268   (.259) -.265   (.269) 
Cotton experience <5 years -.049   (.221) .047   (.230) .067   (.232) 
Cotton experience < 10 years .174   (.184) .392   (.203)** .351   (.208)* 
Cotton grower >10 years Reference Reference Reference 
Duration of residence -.012   (.004)*** -.011   (.004)*** -.012  (.004)*** 
Resident ethnic group .509    (.183)*** .230   (.232) .447   (.196)*** 
Village effects Included Included Included 
Education dummies Included Included Included 
GPC dummies Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Rivers-Vuong endogeneity test  -.365   (.422) - - 
Cut-off  1 -.313   (1.782) -1.658   (.752)*** -2.219   (.784)*** 
Cut-off  2 1.658   (1.798) .328   (.752) -.167   (.782) 
Cut-off  3 3.540   (1.815)* 2.327   (.775)*** 1.826   (.808)*** 
Cut-off  4 4.260   (1.824)*** 3.078   (.786)*** 2.600   (.819)*** 
Cut-off  5 4.900   (1.831)*** 3.733   (.796)*** 3.262   (.829)*** 
Wald Chi² 233.65*** 131.39*** 148.35*** 
Pseudo R²  .294 .226 .248 
ρ (correlation between equations) - .024   (.081) -.243   (.115)** 
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End Notes 
                                                 
1 For a full review of the cotton story and the cotton reform in Burkina Faso and a comparative analysis with its 
neighboring countries, See Kaminski et al. (2009). 
2 Average crop yield has stagnated at around 1.05 tons of seed cotton per hectare during the reform period, as the 
positive trend of individual crop productivity was outweighed by the entry of less productive farmers and land 
(see DGPSA 2006; and Kaminski et al. 2009). 
3 The functioning of these market-oriented village groups has been shown to exhibit no elite capture once 
elaborated governance rules have been set up (Bernard et al. 2008). 
4 It means that the income goal dominates the food security one, that is, interior solutions exist as soon as the 
income goal is achieved while the food-security one needs not to be. Obviously, the food-security goal is 
endogenous since it depends on expected agricultural income unless there is no food market at all. 
5 Note that land has only an exogenous effect in the optimal land and input use decisions in (4). The endogeneity 
comes from the constraints in (3), and are captured by the shadow costs of these constraints. Testing for the 
endogeneity of land cultivation in land use is then of key importance in the empirical results to determine 
whether constraints in (3) are binding. 
6 This is to control for different crop prices histories (local markets) and other social and natural characteristics: 
soil management, land tenure systems, natural constraints on land extension, micro-level climatic changes, 
evolution of communities and ethnic/religious composition or fractionalization, and so on. 
7 Changes in land use are difficult to assess accurately since many farmers intercrop several crops together, so 
measures of land shares are only gross measures. 
8 Ideally, one would use panel data on observed yearly land-use changes to estimate the model (11). 
Unfortunately, many existing panels (like DGPSA) lack part of the information needed to identify (11) under the 
necessary controls to be consistent with our conceptual framework. 
9 Including cotton growers who started to produce cotton after 1996 (50% of the sample, see Table A2). 
10 The questionnaire was designed to minimize strategic and framing biases. In particular, we spent a 
considerable amount of time with farmers to establish their stated preferences, making sure their own ordering 
was consistent with their decisions. We also avoid justification and cognitive biases by asking the questions 
about land-use decisions and land cultivation much later during the interviews. 
11 That is, the less experienced farmers might have to join a group with more constraints on production choices 
or input access. This could be related to their ethnic background, but as time goes by, they can make a better 
match or even form their own group. 
12 The cotton experience variable has five categories, according to the date of entry in cotton production (see 
Table A2 for the five dummies). The value 0 is attributed to those who exited cotton production during the 
cotton reform. The selection equation for the exit/non-exit choice is estimated by Probit. 
